The EU must change its course if it really wants to prevent a nuclear Iran
written by Julian Pfleging, European Horizons at Sciences Po Paris
Executive Summary
The conclusion of the JCPOA in 2015 was undoubtedly one of the most significant achievements of EU foreign policy. However, pride in past achievements should not blur one’s vision of the present. The EU should identify its stakes and interests in the conflict about the Iranian nuclear program and promote them more assertively. It is time for the EU to acknowledge the de facto failure of the JCPOA, work together with the new U.S. administration to renegotiate the JCPOA, fix its flaws, and reassess the EU’s grand strategy towards Iran.
Background
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran, the P5+1, and the EU aims to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon by blocking both uranium and heavy water pathways through restrictions and inspections. The E3 (France, Germany, UK) initially started the protracted negotiations in 2003, after the revelation of a secret Iranian military nuclear program that violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
While formally still in place, the agreement is not fulfilling its purpose anymore. The U.S. withdrew from the JCPOA on 8 May 2018 and reimposed sanctions against Iran. Furthermore, the U.S. introduced extraterritorial sanctions targeting non-US individuals and companies engaging in trade with certain Iranian actors.1 These sanctions hampered the expected economic benefits of the JCPOA for Tehran despite the EU’s attempt to protect EU-Iran trade through the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX). In response, Iran ceased to comply with its obligations under the JCPOA. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed in November 2019 that Iran has resumed enriching uranium at the Fordow site.2 This marked another breach of the agreement after Iran had installed more efficient centrifuges, exceeded the permitted amount of enriched uranium and heavy water stocks, surpassed the permitted degree of enrichment, and unauthorizedly lifted restrictions in nuclear-related Research and Development (R&D).3 The Foreign Ministers of the E3 and former High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) Mogherini declared Iran’s action to be “inconsistent with the JCPoA’s clear provisions” and criticized the “regrettable acceleration of Iran’s disengagement from commitments under the JCPOA.”4 However, following the assassination of General Soleimani, Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif announced on 5 January 2020 that the nuclear program “no longer faces any operational restrictions”.5 The Dispute Resolution Mechanism under paragraph 36 of the JCPOA, which could trigger the reintroduction of UN sanctions under UN Security Council resolution 2231 (“snapback”-sanctions), was suspended without Iran returning to its obligations.
The current situation is dangerous. Iran is not in compliance with the JCPOA and shortens its nuclear breakout time. In November 2020, the IAEA confirmed that Iran stored more than 12 times the amount of enriched uranium allowed under the JCPOA and described the Iranian explanation for uranium traces at an additional undeclared facility as “not credible”.6 Moreover, the Iranian parliament has approved a bill to ramp up uranium enrichment even further.7 However, the results of the 2020 U.S. presidential election opened a window of opportunity for the EU. The gap between EU and U.S. interests and strategy are now significantly narrower than under the Trump administration.
Main issues at stake for the EU
The prevention of an Iranian nuclear weapon has been the primary goal of European diplomats during the negotiations that led to the JCPOA. This objective remains a vital security interest of the EU as it is closely intertwined with the MENA region. Instability and crises in its neighborhood have direct implications for the EU.
Saudi-Arabia and Egypt have long announced their intention to obtain nuclear capability if Iran‘s pursuit of nuclear weapons was successful, thereby credibly backing up fears of a new arms race and nuclear proliferation in the MENA region.8 Additionally, further steps towards an Iranian nuclear bomb would increase the probability of an Israeli preemptive strike under its Begin Doctrine.9 The Iranian leadership has blamed the Israeli Mossad for the assassination of its leading nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, which is likely to increase tensions in the near future.10
A nuclear Iran would likely pursue its regional goals in the Middle East more aggressively since nuclear capability would provide Iran with a stark deterrent against retaliation. This could include increased terrorist attacks against U.S., Saudi Arabian, and Israeli targets by Iranian proxies like Hezbollah and an even more substantial Iranian involvement in states like Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon.11 The destabilization of its neighborhood could generate new migration movements and terrorist threats towards Europe. Additionally, a nuclear breakout of Iran would significantly undermine the NPT and the international security architecture. Hence, the EU’s interest lies in ensuring that Iran cannot obtain nuclear capability in the foreseeable future. In May 2020, HR/VP Borrell and the E3 Foreign Ministers confirmed their commitment to upholding the JCPOA and described it as “a key achievement of the global non- proliferation architecture and currently the best and only way to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.”12 However, considering Tehran’s noncompliance with the agreement, this statement seems to be based on wishful thinking rather than reality.
Merely reinstating the JCPOA does not guarantee a comprehensive resolution of the issue. It is necessary to widen the scope and consider a longer timeframe. Even if fully implemented, the JCPOA does not ensure the prevention of a nuclear Iran in the long term due to the temporary nature of its nuclear restrictions. Articles 1–12 of the JCPOA provide that the nuclear restrictions expire in several steps, with all nuclear restrictions being terminated in 2031.13 The breakout time would be “near zero” only ten years from now.14
Another reason why the JCPOA cannot ensure the prevention of a nuclear Iran is the lack of full disclosure of past Iranian military nuclear activities, which provides the foundation of estimating Iran’s breakout time. However, this vital element was left out in the JCPOA as a concession to Tehran. Consequently, uncertainty regarding the Iranian progress and fears of possible additional secret facilities remain. Accordingly, IAEA Director General Amano stated after the conclusion of the JCPOA that
“we don’t know whether they have undeclared activities or something else. We don’t know what they did in the past. So, we know a part of their activities, but we cannot tell we know all their activities. And that is why we cannot say that all the activities in Iran is in peaceful purposes.”15
This uncertainty is particularly alarming given Iran’s past deception and denial efforts regarding its nuclear program. While iii. of the Preamble of the JCPOA states that “under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons”, Iran’s previous violations of the NPT and JCPOA provide little reason for trust. In 2005, Rohani openly stated his strategy of using the negotiations to gain time and divide Western powers to benefit the advancement of the Iranian nuclear program.16
Policy recommendations
From the analysis of the current situation and the issues at stake for the EU follows a three-step policy recommendation.
1) First, the EU should acknowledge that the JCPOA is currently not delivering. It must realize that the current EU strategy of upholding the JCPOA while Iran is not complying with its provisions under the JCPOA does not ensure the prevention of a nuclear Iran and has created a dangerous situation. While it was strategically wise to keep the JCPOA alive until the dusk of the Trump administration, it is now in the EU’s very interest to regain more control over the course of events. Therefore, the EU must adapt its strategy to the facts on the ground.
2) In a second step, the EU must go beyond the mere reimplementation of the JCPOA in its original form. While a return to the JCPOA would improve the status quo, its mere reinstalment would be short-sighted for the reasons given above. Hence, the EU should quickly engage in discussions with the new U.S. administration and seize this window of opportunity to improve the strained transatlantic relations. A robust transatlantic coalition with harmonized interests should be built to renegotiate the JCPOA. The negotiations’ objective must be an agreement that is not a bet on changing Iranian behavior in the future, but one that reliably prevents a nuclear Iran, not only in the short but in the long-term. To achieve this, the nuclear restrictions must be valid for a more extended period, and all past military nuclear activities must be disclosed to calculate the breakout time accurately. Additionally, Iran’s current high level of uranium enrichment in violation of the JCPOA must be rolled back as a first confidence-building measure. A comprehensive agreement must also address Iran’s destabilizing foreign policy in the MENA region, its support for terrorism, its human rights violations, and its ballistic missile program. President Biden has expressed his ambition to address these issues.17
Recognizing the paramount importance of the nuclear program for Iran’s leadership, this will not be an easy task, but a coalition of the EU, the U.S., and states of the MENA region, including Israel, Saudi-Arabi, Bahrain, and the UAE, is equipped with enough carrots and sticks to pressure Tehran back to the negotiation table and to withstand likely opposition from Moscow and Beijing. In this phase, the EU must show greater willingness to use its economic leverage against Tehran than it has in the past.
3) Thirdly, the EU should reassess its relationship with Iran. Given the incompatibility of Iran’s human rights record, its sponsoring of and active involvement in terrorism (including on European soil), and its destabilizing foreign policy with the values and objectives of the EU laid out in Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the EU should adjust its policies towards Iran. Recent Iranian human rights violations include the suppression of anti-government protests in late 2019, in which Iranian security forces killed around 1,500 protestors, the execution of wrestler Navid Afkari, and the imprisonments of Sciences Po researcher Fariba Adelkhah and human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh.18 While the EU criticized Tehran for the violent suppression of the 2019 protests, it did not draw political consequences.19 Iran’s systematic human rights violations should have a more substantial impact on EU policymaking towards Tehran. Instead of acting “as protective shields” for its “Iranian partners” as former German Foreign Minister Fischer once described its role, the EU should start to treat Iran as the hostile actor it is towards the norms, interests, and values of the EU. 20 The first step in this direction would be an increase in the EU’s cooperation with the democratic civil society in Iran.
1 Rezaei, Farhad (2019): Iran’s Foreign Policy After the Nuclear Agreement. Politics of Normalizers and Traditionalists. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 69.
2 IAEA Board of Governors (2019): Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231, 11 November, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/19/11/gov2019- 55.pdf.
3 Der Spiegel (2019): Internationale Atomenergiebehörde: Iran hat leistungsstärkere Zentrifugen installiert, 9 November, https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/iran-hat-laut-iaea-leistungsstaerkere-zentrifugen-installiert-a- 1285890.html.
4 Auswärtiges Amt (2019): Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom and the EU High Representative, 11 November, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/e3- jcpoa/2265482.
5 Davenport, Kelsey; Masterson, Julia (2020): Iran Announces New Nuclear Deal Breach. P4+1 and Iran Nuclear Deal Alert, 9 January, Arms Control Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2020-01-09/p4-1-iran- nuclear-deal-alert.
6 BBC (2020): Iran’ s enriched uranium stockpile 12 times limit, says IAEA, 12 November, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-54912402.
7 Middle East Monitor (2020): Iran parliament approves bill on uranium enrichment, 3 November, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20201103-iran-parliament-approves-bill-on-uranium-enrichment/.
8 Landau, Emily (2012): When Neorealism meets the Middle East: Iran’s Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons in (Regional) Context, Strategic Assessment, Vol. 15, №3, October, p. 34.
9 Dershowitz, Alan (2015): The Case Against the Iran Deal: How Can We Stop Iran from Getting Nukes?, New York: Rosetta Books, p. 72–75.
10 BBC (2020): Mohsen Fakhrizadeh: Iran blames Israel for killing top scientist, 28 November, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-55111064.
11 Kahl, Colin H. (2012): One Step Too Far. In: Kahl, Colin H.; Waltz, Kenneth: Iran and the Bomb: Would a Nuclear Iran Make the Middle East More Secure? Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, №5, September/October, p. 158.
12 Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères (2020): JCPOA — Joint statement by spokespersons of the Foreign Ministries of France, Germany, the United Kingdom and of the High Representative of the European Union, 30 May, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/iran/the-iranian-nuclear-issue/article/jcpoa- joint-statement-by-spokespersons-of-the-foreign-ministries-of-france.
13 The arms embargo against Iran under UN Security Council resolution 2231 Annex B, Paragraph 5, had expired in October 2020.
14 Lederman, Josh (2015): Obama admits: Deal will give Iran ‘Near Zero’ Breakout Time in 13 Years, The Times of Israel, 7 April, https://www.timesofisrael.com/obama-deal-to-give-iran-zero-breakout-time-in-13-years/.
15 Tobey, William (2015): Can a U.S. Deal Force Iran to Fess Up to the Military Dimensions of Its Nuke Program?, Foreign Policy, 18 June, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/18/can-a-u-s-deal-force-iran-to-fess-up-to- the-military-dimensions-of-its-nuke-program/.
16 Wahdat-Hagh, Wahied (2018): Der iranisch-islamistische Totalitarismus. Eine Dokumentationvon Medienanalysen und Übersetzungen aus der persischen Sprache. Göttingen: Cuvillier Verlag, p. 290–292.
17 Biden, Joe (2020): There’ s a smarter way to be tough on Iran, 13 September, CNN, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/13/opinions/smarter-way-to-be-tough-on-iran-joe-biden/index.html.
18 Reuters (2019): Special Report: Iran’s leader ordered crackdown on unrest — ‘Do whatever it takes to end it’, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-protests-specialreport/special-report-irans-leader-ordered-crackdown-on- unrest-do-whatever-it-takes-to-end-it-idUSKBN1YR0QR.
19 Council of the EU (2019): Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the Recent Protests in Iran, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/12/08/declaration-by-the-high- representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-the-recent-protests-in-iran/.
20 Die Bundesregierung (2004): Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Joschka Fischer, zur Eröffnung der Botschafterkonferenz, 6 September, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/bulletin/rede-des- bundesministers-des-auswaertigen-joschka-fischer — 792544.
